S. A. Qureshi: Why Are We Alone?

5.12.07
This is with reference to S. A. Qureshi's article "Why Are We Alone?" in the 05.12.07 circulation of Dawn. I fully agree with the writer's assertion that "the dynamic of change in a polity has to be through political parties and parliament — not the judiciary." Furthermore, I believe the writer is correct to point an accusatory finger in the direction of Pakistan's elite class for distancing itself from politics in the country. Although I believe it is necessary and desirable for greater participation from this class of Pakistani citizens, I disagree with the claim that the " only way they can do is by joining established political parties." Rather, I feel that to do so would be the very type of short-cut against which the writer cautions us. The established mainstream political parties are, in fact partly to blame for the lack of political participation amongst Pakistanis. The memories of crimes, some very violent ones included, committed by them are still fresh. Their autocratic structures are an additional disincentive for people to become involved.

It seems clear to me that the political process that is "on offer" in Pakistan today is an illegitimate one. Acceptance of such a process will not move the goal of participatory politics any nearer. Additionally, a political process cannot simply be 'offered' from points of authority down to the populace in the manner of a candy or a toy from parents to their children. It must be built from the ground up. What is needed now - what has been needed for many years - is a thorough renewal of Pakistani politics. This can only be achieved by creating new groups and political parties that are not tainted and burdened by blood and money. This is certainly a longer, more difficult, and more idealistic route towards greater and more meaningful political participation, not a short-cut.

4.12.07
we judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, tehran halted its nuclear weapons program. //
- office of the director of national intelligence, usa | iran: nuclear intentions and capabilities | 2007

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Aasim Sajjad Akhtar: Not In My Name

9.11.07
In this article on ZNet, Aasim Sajjad Akhtar offers an analysis of the "War On Terror" in the context of Pakistani politics, society, and culture.

Perhaps the most incisive insight to be had relates to the vicious and violent confluence of externally-directed disruptions - such as the "War On Terror" - and long-standing internal fractures - such as those between Pakistan's social classes, ethnicities and religious groups.

In the 1980s, the war in Afghanistan against the USSR was brought to Pakistan by the USA. In this decade, the "War On Terror" has been brought to Pakistan, again courtesy of the USA and its allies. From one perspective, these two episodes can be explained as the USA utilising its global hegemony to compel Pakistan into lending its support. From another perspective, however, it is clear that there are sections of Pakistan's society and state which subscribe to the ideas and ideals of the USA and lent their support to it willingly, perhaps even eagerly.

These two perspectives do not stand in opposition to each other, but provide an excellent view of the intersection and interplay of global and national forces as they impact Pakistan today.

It is difficult to disagree with Akhtar's assessment of Pakistan's "liberal elite." Over the decades, they have been, at best, indecisive and, at worst, opportunistic. Their support for rulers such as Zia Ul Haq, Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif, and Pervez Musharraf has been vital for each, and catastrophic for Pakistan.

And, with each, the pattern has been the same. There is an initial period of near carte blanche support for the ruling government, during which rulers are permitted to appropriate institutions of the state, while allowing the elite classes modest liberties and affording them material luxuries. Inevitably, rulers abuse their control over the state, corrupting their government and the bureaucracy. The more powerful rulers seek to extend their authority and power beyond institutions of the state, onto cultural, political, and economic institutions. This is followed by a breaking point - such as a curtailment of liberties or luxuries for the privileged - at which the elite classes shift their loyalties to others.

This process is indicative of both the short-sightedness of the elite classes as well as a lack of social solidarity on their part. It seems the privileged citizens of Pakistan do not worry themselves over an unrepresentative government as long as it delivers the goods they desire, even if their fellow, less-privileged, citizens are miserable. It also seems the privileged citizens of Pakistan do not understand that unaccountable autocratic governance cannot have but an unhappy outcome, even if it does deliver the goods in the short term.

During the Musharraf years, the above pattern has been clearly visible. Musharraf was quite enthusiastically supported following his (first) coup. After the USA declared it's Quixotic "War On Terror," and Pakistan was taken on as its Sancho, Pakistan's elite classes basked in the glow of warm international political approval and bathed in the soothing waves of financial assistance. With an emphasis on economic growth over social justice, the government was able to co-opt the elite classes, who were the clear winners of such a policy choice. Unfortunately for the government, it began to overreach itself and - since it has recently begun to directly deny the privileged some of their privileges - loyalties have begun to shift.

The point to stress here is that opposition to the government of the 'President-General' amongst the elite classes has not been founded on the government's failure to provide security to far-flung regions of the NWFP, or by its failure to respect the liberties of the people of Balochistan, or by its failure to reform public elementary education and basic healthcare. Rather, opposition to the general's government amongst the elite classes has been instigated only when class interests have been attacked.

This division, this lack of social solidarity, within Pakistan also exposes the country to manipulation and exploitation by global forces, such as those represented most menacingly by the USA. It is true that the USA exerts a great deal of influence via the threat of its military force. The manner in which Pakistan was compelled to join the USA and its allies should have been a source of indignation for all Pakistanis, uniting them in opposition to such aggression.

Yet, the fact that Pakistan was driven into the "War On Terror" with a very large stick is obscured and glossed over by the two carrots the ruling establishment and the elite classes of Pakistan gleefully accepted: the approval of a powerful and important section of the international political community, and the financial assistance this group provided Pakistan.

The course of the "War On Terror" in Pakistan has been disastrous, but it has largely remained away from the urban centres of privilege. Thus insulated, the elite classes have - knowingly or not - exchanged resistance to the 'war' for a booming stock market, adopted the simplistic rhetoric of 'extremists versus moderates' (like Benazir Bhutto here), and subjected fellow Pakistanis to unimaginable violence and misery. Acting in the name of the elite classes' 'moderation,' the 'President-General' and his government have alienated large sections of the population. This, of course, has only exacerbated the problem of right-wing, religious fanaticism.

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29.9.07
we forget that there exists a dialectical opposition between rules of military organization and principles of governing a society. one relies on command; the other on consensus. one favors regimen; the other requires participation. one stresses discipline; the other values accountability. one rests on order; the other on participation. that is why, when they assume power, armies distort societies, repress politics, demoralize and corrupt themselves, and lose wars. //
- eqbal ahmad | no, not again! | dawn | 1992

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8.9.07
telling any old thing to someone is to transform them into any old person. this is precisely what the news media do. //
- jean baudrillard | fragments: cool memories iii, 1991-1995 | 1997

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Benazir Bhutto: Pakistan's Moment Of Truth

30.8.07
In the midst of "power-sharing" negotiations with Pervez Musharraf, Benazir Bhutto has come out with this article in the IHT. Despite her clichéd rhetorical attempts at dramatising the present - by styling it as a "moment of truth" or a "turning point" - and presenting herself as the heroine in the tale, Bhutto does, i feel, make some points worth commenting on.

Her insistence on political freedom and free and fair elections, and, particularly, her emphasis on empowering the average person are all very compelling. However, we should keep in mind that these are the sorts of universal principles that will ring sweetly in the ears of the neo-liberals who are running this show, the same "international community" she accuses (indirectly and feebly) of supporting Musharraf, but without whom Bhutto herself stands little chance of political survival.

Bhutto also clearly subscribes to the view that there is a fight to be fought between religious extremists and 'moderates' (whoever moderates might be). This idea may (and should, i hope) sound awfully familiar because it is, of course, the fundamental assumption of the impossible ideological "War On Terror." According to Bhutto, "the hearts and souls of the people" are the prizes for the victors in this great confrontation. I can't speak for the other "people," but i must say having my heart and soul treated as the spoils of war doesn't make me feel very empowered.

There's more to the article along similar lines, but one thing is as clear to me now as it was years ago: Bhutto had her chance at empowering the average Pakistani citizen and she failed miserably. Instead, she exploited the trust placed in her by the "people." Although i am cautious of speaking about "moments of truth," i do believe Pakistan's immediate future holds great promise; that is precisely why Pakistanis can't afford to present their future to a proven failure.

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31.7.07
let me try to put this in a more immediate context. i give a talk in a room. the reach of my words is bounded by the absolute space of those particular walls and limited to the absolute time of the talk. to hear me people have to be there within that absolute space during that absolute time. people who cannot get in are excluded and those that come later will not hear me. those who are there can be identified as individuals - individuated - each according to the absolute space, such as the seat occupied, for that time. but i am also in a relative space with respect to my audience. i am here and they are there. i try to communicate across the space through a medium - the atmosphere - that refracts my words differentially. i talk softly and the clarity of my words fades: the back row can't hear at all. if there is a video-feed to aberdeen i can be heard there but not in the back row. my words are received differentially in relative space-time. individuation is more problematic since there are many people in exactly the same relative location to me in that space-time. all the people in the fourth row are equidistant from me. a discontinuity in space-time arises between those who can hear me and those who cannot. the analysis of what is going on in the absolute space and time of the talk given in the room looks very different when analysed through the lens of relative space-time. but then there is the relational component too. individuals in the audience bring to the absolute space and time of the talk all sorts of ideas and experiences culled from the space-time of their life trajectories and all of that is co-present in the room: he cannot stop thinking of the argument over breakfast, she cannot erase from her mind the awful images of death and destruction on last night's news. something about the way i talk reminds someone else of a traumatic event lost in some distant past and my words remind someone else of political meetings they used to go to in the 1970s. my words express a certain fury about what is going on in the world. i find myself thinking while talking that everything we are doing in this room is stupid and trivial. there is a palpable sense of tension in the room. why aren't we out there bringing the government down? i extricate myself from all these relationalities, retire back into the absolute and relative spaces of the room and try to address the topic of space as a key word in a dry and technical manner. the tension dissipates and someone in the front row nods off. i know where everyone is in absolute space and time but i have no idea, as the saying goes, "where peoples' heads are at." i may sense that some people are with me and some are not but i never know for sure. yet this is, surely, the most important element of all. that, after all, is where shifting political subjectivities lie. the relationality is elusive if not impossible to pin down, but it is none the less vitally important for all that. //
- david harvey | space as a key word | spaces of global capitalism: towards a theory of uneven geographical development | 2006

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